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SCREENING, COMPETITION AND (DE)CENTRALIZATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Standard economic analyses of a market are traditionally concerned with the competitíon
between firms. Firms are choosing strategies and taking actions in order to maximize profits and
their interactions result in an industry equilibrium. This approach is rather silent about the internal
functioning of firms due to the level of aggregation that is adopted. The firm is treated as a black
box, which implies that the decision processes and procedures are taken for granted. However, the
way in which firms are internally organized might have consequences for their behaviour in the
market. Chandler (1990) argues that a perspective relying on markets only in order to understand
industrial development is likely to be seriously flawed. He advocates the view that firms and
markets evolve together, whereas the former seems more important than the latter in the
understanding industrial outcomes.
This paper investigates the relationship between the internal and industrial organization of
firms. There are many internal organization choices to be taken. We focus on how different
evaluations of the same project are aggregated into an organization decision. Many examples of
such choices are around. All members of the security council of the United Nations evaluate each
issue and cast their vote. Acceptance of a proposal requires unanimiry. Members of parliament
vote on many different issues. The adoption of a new law is usually done by majoriry voting, but
constitutional changes require a two third majority. Scientific journals base their acceptance of a
paper on reports of referees. The journal has to decide how many referees will evaluate a paper,
whether a paper is evaluated simultaneously or sequentially and how their reports are put into a
journal decision. A capital budgetting procedure of a fitm has to answer which research proposal
will be adopted and whether this is done in a decentralized fashion or has to get the approval by
many different bureaus. A judicial system has to take some decisions regarding the possibilities of
appeal. An accounting firm checking the annual reports of their clients has to decide internally
whether a rejection of a report by one of their employees should be checked again or not.
University professors don't need the approval of their colleagues in order to start a new research
project.
Some aspects of the variety of decision procedures are dealt with in this paper. The
internal organízation choice is referred to as the choice of architecture (Sah and Stiglitz, 1985) or
perceptron (Rubinstein, 1993). An architecture describes how individual or local decisions are
aggregated into an organization decision. Many different aggregation rules are possible, but we3
will limit ourselves to two possibilities. A polyazchy accepts a certain project when there is at
least one individual supporting the project. Reseazch projects in universities provide an example.
If some member of the scientific community considers a projecx as pmmissing, then (s~e carries
it out without having to ask somebody for approval. A hierarchy only accepts a project when
everybody is favoring it. The above example of the security council provides an illustration.
Tbe performance of the different aggregation rules is analyzed by distinguishing four kinds
of decisioas: a good (bad) project is either accepted or rejected. Failures are modelled as type-I
and type-II errors, where the probability of rejecting good pmjects is a type-I error and the
probability of accepting bad projects is a type-II error. A polyarchy and hierarchy differ with
respect to the probability of accepting good and bad projects. A polyarchy accepts a larger
percentage of projects than a hierazchy. This is true for good as well as bad projerts. Decentrali-
zed structures like a polyazchy have therefore a relative advantage in accepting good projects,
whereas a centralized structure like a hierazchy is preferred when rejecting bad projects is of pri-
mazy importance. Aggregation rules (azchitecture choices) are evaluated by considering their
likelihood of failure and success and their associated payofïs.
An azchitecture usually faces some rivals in a market environment. Universities compete
for Ph-D students. Eacó candidate is screened by several faculty members. The question is
whether the architecture choice of a university is influenced by having other universities azound.
The same question applies to the adoption of projects by firms. However, a distinction has to be
made between projects that can be carried out by only one firm and projects which may be
adopted by more than one firm. It determines the nature of competition after the approval
decision. An example of the first case is the construction of a bridge or the above example of the
Ph-D students. The development of a new drug illustrates the second case, because several firms
may start independently with it. This second case will be treated in this paper.
The comp~ition between azchitectures features prominently in this azticle, whereas Sah
and Stiglitz concentrate on a firm in isolation. The industrial organization effects of tiie internal
organization choice are analyzed by considering a model in whicó two architectures compete
against each other. There are zeco, one or two firms in the market, which depends on their
evaluations of the project. Zero firms are in the market when both architectures reject a project. A
firm is a monopolist when it accepts a project and the other firm rejects it. It is assumed that the
firms shaze the market when they both accept a good project. So, a firm accepting a project is
either a monopolist or duopolist, depending on the acceptance decision of the rival firm. The loss
incurred due to accepting a bad project is assumed to be independent of market structure. 7'hese
duopoly features reduces the attractiveness of the mazket on average and is responsible for the4
result that more fitTns in the market will favor the acceptance of a hierarchy when the acceptance
and rejection probabilities are exogenous (Hendrikse, 1992). Another result is that a hierarchy and
polyarchy may coexis[ in equilibrium.
Architectures do not only have to decide which aggregation rule they are going to use, but
they also have to determine with which probability a local screener has to accept or reject
projects. Students applying for graduate school face a minimal grade requirement and a minimal
expected return on investment plays an imponant role in the allocation of funds to investment
projects in a capital budgetting process. The toughness of screening (i.e. the height of acceptance
and rejection probabilities) depends on the benefits associated with type-I and -II errors, the
ponfolio composition, the choice of architecture and the structure of the market. Acceptance and
rejection probabilities are endogertized in this paper. A two stage game theoretic model is
developed in order to analyse the screening level choices in a competitive environment. The first
stage detetmines the choice of architecture, whereas the probabilities, by setting reservation
screening levels, are chosen in the second stage. This sequence of moves seems natural. Casual
empiricism suggests that there are considerable costs involved in changing organizational structure
(architecture). These costs are sunk because the old architecture can not be sold to someone else.
Architecture decisions are therefore of a long term nature and belong in the firs[ stage. Reservati-
on screening level choices are less difficult or costly to change. They are of a short term nature
and are chosen after the choice of architecture has been made.
The profit maximizing architecture and screening level choice is considered first in the
monopoly case. I[ turns out that a polyarchy is chosen when the portfolio is very bad. The reason
is that the screening level is set at such a high level that all bad projects are rejected by all
bureaus. The relative advantage of a hierarchy in rejecting bad projects is therefore eliminated.
Only good projects are accepted and a polyarchy is good at that. The opposite result emerges
when the portfolio is attractive. Screening levels are set at a level at which all good projects are
accepted. The task for the organization is to reject bad projects and this is done best by a
hierarchy. Notice that these architecture choice results with endogenous screening levels are the
opposite of the results when screening levels are exogenous.
Reaction functions in screening levels are determined in the duopoly case. They do not
have a positive slope and are therefore strategic substitutes in the terminology of Fudenberg and
Tirole (1984). A higher screening level of the rival reduces his acceptance probability of good as
well bad projects and therefore increases the attractiveness of the market. The profit maximizing
response is a lower screening level.
The profit maximizing strategy is determined by the slope of the reaction function and the5
nature of investment. Strategic substitutes imply that an aggressive action will be met by a passive
response by the rival. 7be nature of investment determines what aggressive behaviour entails.
Define the degree of decenualization as the level of investment. An identical screening level at
local bureaus in a hierazchy and a polyazchy implies differeat acceptance probabilities in these
azchitecdues and therefore a different mazket for the other firm. A rival changing from a
óierazchy to a polyazchy reduces the aaractiveness of the mazket for the firm. Investment is
thecefore hazd, i.e. a higher level of investment reduces the profits of the rival. Strategic
considerations favor a high degree of decentralization, i.e. a polyarchy. Notice that this tendency
towazds polyazchy holds for a fixed number of competitors in the industry. This strategic effect
may be countered by the effect of the number of fu-ms in the industry. It reduces the ezpected
revenue of a firm. A óierazchy is relatively good at dealing with the subsequent increased
importance of preventing type-II errors. The same effect is established by choosing a higher
screening level.
Another aspect of azchitecture choice is that it involves a spillover effect. ~e profit
maximizing response of the rival to a change from a hierazchy to a polyarchy of the other firms is
a higher screening level, given the screening level at tl~e local bureaus of the other firm. It
changes the negatively sloping pazt of the reaction function from a convex shape to a concave
shape. This spillover effect reinforces the choice of a polyazchy from a strategic point of view.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the model. Section three derives
and ezplains the results in the monopoly case. Screening level and azchitecture choice in a
duopoly aze treated in section four. Finally, conclusions and avenues for further research aze
offered.
II. MODEL
A firm is defined as a collection of bureaus. Eacó bureau evaluates projects and decides to
either accept (A) or reject (R) a project. The pool of projects faced by a bureau consists of good
and bad projects. A good project generates a positive payoff, whereas a bad project has a negative
retum. It is assumed that there aze errors of judgment involved in deciding which project to adopt.
This is modelled by incorporating a probability that a bad project is accepted and a probability
that a good project is rejected.
It is assumed that every individual (bureau) is evaluatinglsampling the same projects and
that this is done independently. Suppose that a bureau is accepting a project with probability p and6
that a fu-m con.cists of two bureaus. Figure 1 represents this situation.
Tbe incidence of type errors made by an organization is influeaced by the way in which
individual decisions are aggregated into an organization decision. Sa6 and Stiglitz (1985) have
modelled this by defining a hierazchy as an organization which only accepts a project when there
is unanimity between all bureaus, whereas a polyazchy only rejects a project when every bureau
rejects it. A polyazchy will accept a particular project with probability p(2-p), whereas this









Figure 1: Firm as a collection of bureaus
The composition of the portfolio of projects is characterized by a, which is defined as the
proportion of good projects in the pool of available projects. A particulaz project is therefore good
or bad, which has to be reflected in the probability p. This probability is a conditional probability
and we define therefore more specifically p(A ~ B) as the probability that a bad project is accepted
and p(A ~ G) as the probability that a good project is accepted. The acceptance probability of a
firm depends on five aspects. They are the nature of the project, the composition of the portfolio,
the acceptance probability of a particulaz bureau, the number of bureaus and the azchitecture
choice of the firm. The acceptance probability of a bad project by a hierazchy with two bureaus is
(1-a)p(A ~ B)Z. Similarly, a polyarchy with two bureaus accepts a good project with probability
aP(A ~ G)(2-P(A ~ G).
It is sufficient for our purposes to deal with the probabilities of accepting good and bad
projects for the azchitecture as a whole. Define f„(,fP) as the probability that a hierazchy
(,polyarchy) is accepting a good project and g„(,gP) as the probability that a hierazchy (,polyarchy)
is accepting a bad project. A polyazchy with two bureaus has therefore f, - p(A ~ G)(2-p(A ~ G)).7




i.e. a polyazchy accepts a lazger propoRion of good as well as bad projects compazed to a
hierazchy.
It is assumed that there is some filtering, i.e. the probability that a bad project is judged to





The present value of costs associated with accepting a bad project aze defined to be W,
whereas a good project generates a payoff of V. The duopoly case involves two values of
accepting a good project. It depends on the decision of the rival whether the mazket has to be
shazed or not. We assume that the gains associated with a good project are split equally when both
azchitectures accept the project. The loss associated with accepting a bad project is assumed to be









Figure 2: Acceptance decisions and duopoly payoffs8
The ezpected profits of a mooopolist having architecture i are
Y; - af;V - (1-a)g;W.
The experted profits of a firm having architecture i and facing a competitor with
architecture j are Yq. We have therefore
Y~ - af; (f~Vl2 f (1-f~V) - (1-a)g;W
- af;(1-f;12)V - (1-a)g;W.
We óave assumed that the probability of acceptance is f; and the probability of rejection is
g;. These probabilities are the aggregation of probabilities of lower bureaus accepting projects.
The probability of a lower bureau accepting a project was taken independent of the architecdue.
One way of endogenizing this probability is to assume that each project evaluator uses a
reservation screening level S` (Sa6 and Stiglitz, 1986). If the observed profit is above the
reservation tevel then the project is accepted, and it is rejected otherwise. Suppose that the project
evaluator observes
y-xte,
where z is the benefit of the project and A is distributed independently of a. The distribution
function of A is denoted by M(A) and its density by m(A). The screening function, then,is given
by
p(z,S) . Prob{y 2 S} - 1- M(S-z).
Changing S óas two effects. "Increasing S increases the probability of a good project being
rejected (Type-I error) and decreases the probability of a bad projert being accepted (Type-II
error). The reservation price is chosen to balance off these ercors" (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, p
722).
We will assume that the portfolio of projects consists of only two types. The return on a
good project is V, whereas a bad project yields -W. It is also assumed for reasons of tractability
that there are only two bureaus in an architecture. We óave therefore9
fH (V,S") - (P(V,S~)2
8x (-W,S`~ - (P(-W,S`~)2
fr (V,S7 - P(V,S7(2-P(V,S7)
8r (-W,S7 - P(-W,S7(2'P(-W.S~).
Firms have to make two choices. They determine first tàeir architecture choice simultane-
ously and independently. The profit mazimizing screening levels are chosen simultaneously and
independently after the architecture choice has beEn made. This two stage game is solveà for its
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
III. Monopoly
The determination of the architecture choice is difficult without a specification of the
distribution of B because the reservation screening levels are set differently in the different
systems. We consider therefore the case where the proportion of good projects in the initial
portfolio is less than one-half (, i.e. O G a G.~, the distribution of errors is uniform with support
[-~,~Y] and 0 G V,W G~Y. Technicalities regarding the derivation of the profit mazimizing
screening level choice can be found in the appendiz. The flavor of our results is described by
focussing on boundary solutions for the profit mazimizing screening level choice. Figure 3
summarizes the profit mazimizing screening level and architetture choice of a monopolist.
(Boundary as well as interior solutions are derived in the appendiz. They are summarized in
figure 6.)Io
a S' Architecture choice
SP-~-W
aGa" P
S" - ~Y - W
S'-~-W P~H
a"SaGa~
S" --~ f V M aV G(1-a)W
S'--~tV
aP 5 a H
S"--~fV
Figure 3: Profit mazimizing screening level and architecture choice.
T'here are a number of conclusions to be drawn from figure 3. First, screening levels
don't increase when the portfolio improves. This is obvious because an improved portfolio
increases the probability of a good project being rejected. ~e appropriate response is therefore to
set the screening level at a lower level, or at least not to iacrease it.
Second, a polyarchy is chosen when the portfolio is bad. This seems to be counterintuid-
ve, given the results with ezogenous screening levels. However, the profit mazimizing screening
level is set at such a high level that the probability of accepting a bad project is reduced to zero.
A firm is therefore accepting only good projects. If somebody Icnows that the project is good witó
probability one because y ~~- W, then the organization should accept it. A polyarchy is doing
that.
Third, an organization chooses a hierarchy when the portfolio is relatively good. The
screening levels are chosen low eaough such that all good projects are accepted. The probability
of accepting a bad project has to be minimized and this is done by a hierarchy. If one of the
bureaus knows for sure that the project is bad because y G-~ f V, then this bureau should have
veto power in rejecting the project. A hierarchy implements this feature.
Fourth, we saw in the previous section that a hierarchy rejects more good projects than a
polyarchy when screening levels are ezogenous. A hierarchy will respond to this disadvantage by
setting a lower screening level than a polyarchy for intermediate levels of the portfolio composi-
tion when the reservation screening level choice is endogenous.
Finally, a polyarchy will be chosen for intermediate levels of the portfolio composition if
and only if aV -(1-a)W is negative. An increase in V increases the range of values of W for
which a hierarchy is chosen. The explanation for this is that the reservation screening level of a
hierarchy is increasing, whereas the screening level of a polyarchy doesn't change. The perfor-il
mance of a hierarchy is improved with respect to the rejaction of bad projects, whereas a
polyazchy maintains the same probability of rejecting bad projocta. An increase in W might result
in a switcó from a hierazchy to a polyarchy. The reservaiion screening level of a polyarchy is
adjusted downward, whereas S" doesn't change. This implies that a polyarchy improves its
performance with respect to the acceptance of good projects, whereas a óierazchy does not. Tbe
compazative statics regazding a change in the portfolio composition is similaz to the change in V.
Figure 4 summarizes the compazative statics results regazding the azchitecture choice of a
monopolist for the situation witè exogenous screening tules (Hendrikse, 1992) azid endogenous
screening rules. T1te pazameter k in tàe graphs of the exogeaous screening ntle case depends on
p(A ~ G) and p(A ~ B). The case k~ 1, which holds whea p(A ~ G) c.5, is reflected in figure
4.
Screening rule
Portfolio composition exogenous endogenous
v v
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Figure 4: Portfolio composition and azchitecture choice12
IV. Duopoly
The screening level choice of rival j affects the ezpected profits of azchitecture i, because
it determines the probability of having a monopoly or duopoly. Having a potential rival firm in
the mazket reduces the ezpected value of winning. These ezpeded profits aze
af;(1-f~l2)V - (1 - a)B;W.
The strategic interdependence between the profit mazimizing screening level choices
follows immediately from the above equation. The profit mazimizing screening level choice S'
depends on S', because S~ determines f;. The compazative statics analysis in the monopoly situation
indicated that a worsening of the portfolio results in a screening level choice whicó is non
decreasing. A less attractive portfolio might be due to a óigher probability of óaving a rival in the
mazket. This occurs when the screening level of the other firm decreases. We have therefore a
negative relationship between the screening level choices. The reaction or best response functions
have a negative slope, where the reaction function of azchitecture i is defined as the profit
mazimizing response of S' on Si. Screening levels aze strategic substitutes in the terminology of
Fudeaberg and Tirole (1984).
A second implicatioa is that the choice of architecture involves a spillover effect. The
profit mazimizing screening level choice of azchitecture i is influenced by the value of ~. The
value of f; depends on the choice of architecture, given the level of S'. If firm j adopts a
polyazchy, then fP(V,SP) - p(V,S7(2-p(V,S7). The probability p(V,S~ is equal to 0 when
SP -~Y - W and increases to 1 when SP decreases to -~Y f V. The decrease in SP increases
f,(V,S7 at a decreasing rate, i.e. changes in SP will have a smaller impact on the reservation
screening level choice of firm i when the value of SP is lower. The slope of the reaction function
of a firm facing a polyazchy is therefore finite when the rival has a screening level for its local
bureaus just below ~- W, whereas the reaction function is vertical when the screening level
choice of the rival is equal to -~ t V. T'he reverse holds when firm j has a óierazchy, because
f"(V,S") - p(V,S")Z. Changes in S" óave a small impact on the profit mazimizing screening level
of firm i when S" is close to ~Y - W, whereas it has a lazge impact when it is approaching
-~Y f V. The slope of the reaction function of a firm facing a hierazchy is therefore finite when
the rival has a screening level for its local bureaus just above -~Y f V, whereas the reaction
function is vertical when the screening level choice of the rival is equal to ~Y - W. Notice that
fP(V,~Y-W) - f"(V,~-W) - 0 and fP(V,-~YfV) - f"(V,-~YfV) - 1. We have therefore that the13
profit maximizing screening level of architecture i when faced with architecture j is higher (not
lower) for j- P than j- H when the level of 9 is fixed. ~is means in terms of reaction
functions that R~ is located to the right of R~, i.e. architecture i will choose a higher screening
level for its local bureaus when faced with a polyazchy than whea the rival has adoptsd a
hierarchy. RÏ is defined as the reaction function of azcàiteciure i facing architecture j. A rival
switching to a polyarchy renders the mazket less amactive, which implies that the profit mazimi-





Figure 5: Reaction function of architecture i facing architecture j
Figure 5 depicts the strategic substitute and the spillover features of the profit maximizing
screening level choice. It also illustrates that R`~ and R~ have the same shape. The previous
section has shown that a hierarchy will never choose a higher screening level than a polyazchy in
order to compensate for its relative high incidence of type-I errors. R~ is therefore located to the
left of R~. Similarly, R~ is located to the left of R~ and they have the same curvature.
One standard property of reaction functions with strategic substitutes seems to be violated
in figure 5. T7ie profits of firm i decrease when the level of Sti decreases. However, screening
levels apply to local bureaus in an architecture, whereas the relevant strategic variable for a firm
is the acceptance probability of a rival firm. If we transform the screening level choice of bureaus
in firm i and j into acceptance probabilities of good projects and use these probabilities as strategic
variables, then we retain the property that profits on the reaction function of a firm increase when
the level of the strategic vaziable of the rival fu-m is lower.
The curvature of the reaction function implies that there are three pure strategy Nash
equilibria in screening levels when both firms adopt the same architecture. One equilibrium14
consists of firm 1 choosing screening level ~-W for its local bureaus and firm 2 choosing -~Yi-V.
Tbe second equilibrium reverses these screening level choices. Finally, there is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium in which both firms choose the same screening level. The slopes of the readion
functions in the neighborhood of this equilibrium aze sucó that this equilibrium is unstable. 7be
ezplicit ezpression for the symmetric Nash equilibrium screening level choice can be obtained by
using the formula of Cardano for equations of degree three. The solution is cumbersome and will
not be presented. The comparative statics analysis with respect to the pazameters, a, V, W and ~
shows that the equilibrium screening level choice will decrease when eitàer a~ increases or V
increases, i.e. saeening will be less tough when the ezpected gain of choosing a project goes up.
The sarne result emerged in the monopoly situation. Figure 9 in the append'u~ illustrates these
results for the duopoly situation. Finally, there are two pure, asymmetric Nash equilibria when the
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Figure 6: Equilibrium screening rules, given the choice of azchitecture15
If the strategic situation is such that one of the firms is allowed to choose its screening
level first, then it will try to structure the mazket to its own advantage by the choice of its
architecture. Tbe strategic aspects of the screening level choice aze analysed by using the strategy
typology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). There is one incumbent firm and a rival considering
entry into the industry. The profit mazimizing business strategy of the incumbent depends on the
nature of competition (strategic substitutes or strategic oomplemeats), the nature of investment
(hard or soft) and the entry decision of the rival firm. An implication of a mazket with strategic
substitutes is that an aggressive (passive) decision by the iacumbeat will be followed by a passive
(aggressive) choice of the follower. The profit maximizing strategy for the leader in this siwation
is to behave always aggressive, regardless the entry decision of the rival.
The strategy typology requires a definition of investment and the determination of its
nature. The investment decision is the choice of architecture. (Notice that investment is a discrete
vaziable because it is either a polyarchy or a hierazchy.) Investment is defined as the amount of
decentralization. A switch from a hierarchy to a polyazchy is an increase in the level of investment
(decentralization). Another way of interpreting this decision is to view azchitecture choice as an
investment in the probability of accepting a project. Investment is defined as hazd (soft) when an
increase in the level of investrnent decreases (increases) the profits of the rival firm. Decentraliza-
tion is a hard investment because a switch to a polyazchy increases the probability of accepting a
project. This results in a less aaractive mazket for the rival. The second important aspect of
invesunent in the determination of the strategic azchitecture choice is the spillover effect.
Investment in decentralization implies a negative spillover effect. (The adoption of a polyarchy
increases the acceptance probability of a project by the incumbent and therefore reduces the
attractiveness of the market for the rival.)
The entry decision of the rival is the final ingredient in the strategic over- or underinvest-
ment decision by the incumbent. It óas been shown that investment in decentralization is a hazd
investment, screening levels aze strategic substitutes (i.e. reaction function has a negative slope)
and there is a negative spillover effect. This implies that the incumbent will overinvest in
decentralization, regazdless the entry decision of the rival. An aggressive decision (overinvestment
in decentralization) by the incumbent structures the market in such a way that the profit maximi-
zing response of the rival will be passive or there will be no entry at all. This strategy is called
the Top Dog strategy. The negative spillover effect only reinforces the overinvestment decision.
The strategic choice of a polyarchy by the incumbent reduces the amount of type-I errors and the
intensity of rivalry. However, the number of type-II errors will increa5e, which is responded to by
a higher screening level.16
Figure 6 seems to be at odds with this result when it is assumed that the multiplicitly of
equilibria is resolved by having the incumbent choose a screening level fust. Point A is, due to
boundary effects, always most attractive to incumbeat i. ~e profit mazimizing screening level of
the incumbent is so low that it accepts all good projects. It is important to prevent type-II errors,
which is achieved by choosing a hierazchy. The choice of architecture by the incumbent will
therefore not have any effect on the profits of the eatrant. ~ere is a difference regazding the
acceptance of bad projects at -1G t V between the two arcbitecxure choices of the incumbeat.
However, this does not influence the payoffs of the entrant, i.e. f;, ~t g;, determines the payoffs
of entrant j. ~e profit mazimizing screening level respoase of the ernrant to -tG f V is tG - W,
which results in the rejection of all bad projects. Entrant j has to m~nim~~e type-I errors in its
choice of a profit mazimizing azchitecture. This is done by a polyazchy.
Notice that the approach adopted in this paper is not in line with the famous observation
by Chandler (1962) that 'Structure follows Strategy'. Structure (azchitecture) is the long run
decision vaziable of the model and is therefore put in the first stage of the game, whereas the
screening level has a short run flavour and emerges in the second stage of the game. ~is
sequencing of decisions seems to imply that strategy follows structure. However, this is not
correct. These observations aze trying to formulate an answer to an ill formulated question. The
solution method of bacl~vazd induction implies that the first period will set the stage for and
induce certain behavior in the second stage, but the second period will also cast its shadow
backwazd to the first period. Architecture and screening level choice aze determined jointly.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
We have shown that the choice of azchitecture is determined by the number of competi-
tors, decision theoretic as well as strategic considerations. Decision theoretic aspects were
reflected by the probabilities of accepting and rejecting projects. The costs and benefits associated
with bad and good projects determined the profit mazimizing azchitecture choice. The number of
competitors influenced this choice because the benefits of accepting a good project were reduced
in the duopoly situation. This favored the adoption of a hierarchy. Strategic considerations may
also óave an effect on the aggregation rule adopted by the incumbent firm because it structures the
ezpected payoffs of a potential entrant. Screening rules turned out to be strategic substitutes. A
polyazchy is usually favored from a strategic point of view.
There are several other interesting issues to be addressed in this environment. Ezamples17
aze the optimal number of decision units in an azchitecture (, represented in f,,, g,,, fP and gP) and
the optimal degree of consensus (Sah and Stiglitz, 1988). 7hird, the performance of the different
azchitectures might be enhanced by taking into account the information generated by the decision
of the lower bureau. Evaluators can update their prior information from observing other
evaluators' acceptance or rejection decision. A rejecxion in a polyazchy or an acceptance in a
hierazchy changes the screening level choice of the higher bureau (Meyer, 1991). Fourth, the
quality of the remaining pool of projects (a) changes whea a project is evaluated. Fifth, the result
of more competition resulting in more centralized decision struct)ues depends on the assumption
that the investment costs associated with a bad project in a duopoly are of the same magnitude as
those in a monopoly. A richer model might make these costs dependent on market structure
(L,oury, 1979). Sizth, capacity limits regarding the number of projects that can be ezecuted
influences the intensity of rivalry in the mazket. Finally, a topic not dealt with in this paper are
incentive considerations (Seber and Wu, 1992).ls
APPENDIX
We will derive the profit mazimizing architecxtue and screening level choice of a
monopolist. The duopoly situation in terms of reaction functiona will be treated subsequently. The
analysis proceeds like in the classical theory of statistical infereace. A decision fimcxion will be
derived which tells us what action to take based on the sample data. (A decision function is chosen
which, in some way, keeps type I and II errors as small as possible.) It is constructed to minimi~p
Bayes risk, i.e. the ezpected value of tlle risk function. The risk function is the expected loss
associated with a parametervalue characterizing the unknown distribution. ~e decision function is
in our model the profit mazimizing reservation screening level and the sample data consists of the
outcome of the evaluation of a project by a bureau. Bayes risk can be calculated because the
distribution of projects and the ezact value of all the losses (V and W) is known.
Define z as the net benefit of a project. We assume that
z-
-W , 1-a
where V,W e(O,~Y) and a C. 5. The probability that a project with benefit z will be accepted is
p(z,S') ~ Prob{y 2 S'} - Prob{z t 6 Z S'} - 1- M(S'-z)
where 9 e U(-~,~Y), i.e. 6 has an uniform distribution with support [-~Y,~Yj.
We will face several intervals in determining the profit mazimizing screening level. It is
therefore convenient to define the indicator function
1 , c e (a,b)
Ic.s~(c) -
0 , otherwise.
7'he probability of accepting a project can now be written as19
P(z,S') - I(--.-i~(S'-x) t(1 - M(S `-a)) i(-i.iJ(S ~-z)
- I (S'-x) . (1-S~-x}~) I (S'-x)
(-v.-i) 2~r t-i.il
, `~i7C-S' , )
- I(-..-i)(S ~-z) f 2~ I[-i.il(S ~-z
and the derivative of this probability with respect to the reservation screening level S` as
p,,(z,S ) - -m(S'-z)
-1 j (S'-x). - 2;~, -I-i.iJ
The contribution of the two local bureaus determines the ezpected profits of architecture i.
The ezpecteà profits of architecture i are af;V -(1-a)g;W. Eacé bureau in a firm is choosing its
profit mazimizing reservation screening level independently of the other bureau. The first order
condition with respect to the ezpected profit mazimizing screening level in a symmetric Nash
equilibrium for a polyarchy is
E{z(2-p(z,S 7)p,,(z,S ~} - 0
.. - E{z(3~Y}S P-x)IJ-i tJ(S'-z)}I4~Y2 - O
w aV(3~YtS P-V)I~-i.iJ(S P-~-(1-a)W(3~Y}S PtW)I(-i.tJ(S'rW) - 0
a SP - -3`Y ~ aVZI~-i.iJ(SP-V)t(1-a)WZI~-i.il(SP'~
aVI~-i.tJ(S P-V)-(1-a)WI~-i.iJ(S PtW)
Notice that SP is inversely related to a. An improved portfolio decreases the profit maximizing20
reservation screening level. The first order condition for a hierarchy is
E{xp(a,S ")p,.(x,S ~} z 0
p S" - ~ } aV~-i.t~(S"-V)t(1-a)WZt-i.rtl(S"}~
aVIt-t.tl(S "-V)-(1-a)WI[-t.t~(S ".W).
liie indicator functions in the expressions of the profit mazimizing reservation screeaing
levels delineate five intervals. If S' S-~- W, then every project will be accepted and the
probability of accepting a project is therefore one. T'he ezpected profits are the same for both
architectures and equal to aV-(1-a)W.
Suppose that -~Y-W G S' S-~Y f V. Botó ezpressions yield a solution which does not
fall within this interval. We have therefore a boundary solution. Both architecnires mazimize their
expected profits by choosing their reservation screening level equal to -~ fV. This is obvious
because any realization of y smaller than -~ f V reveals that the project is bad. Ezpected profit
mazimization requires that the reservation screening level should be at least -~Y f V. The
ezpected profits of a polyarchy are
aV - (1-a)W(2~-V-W)(2~Y;VfW)I4~Y2 (1)
and those of a hierarchy are
aV - (1-a)W(2~Y -V-W)z14~Y2. (2)
It is obvious that the profits of a polyarchy are smaller than those of a hierarchy. Every good
project will be accepted by both architectures for this reservation screening level. The performan-2i
ce of an architecture depends therefore only on how good they are at rejecting bad projects. A
hierazchy is best at doing that.
Suppose that -~ f V c S` c~-W. Define
k(a,V,V~ ~ aVzt(1-a)W~.
aV - (1-a)W
The function k(a,V,W) is decreasing in a. The expression of the profit maximizing reservation
screening level of a polyarchy is
S P - -3~Y ; k(a,V,W).
This is an interior solution when
2~Y } V G k(a,V,W) C 4~Y - W.
The interior solution is a decreasing function of a, i.e. an improvement in the composition of the
portfolio will lower the profit mazimizing screening level of local bureaus in a polyarchy.
The boundary solution ~- W generates ezpected profits of
aV(VtW)(4~-V -W)I4~Yz. (3)
This boundary solution will emerge when there is not an interior solution and
(1) 5 (3)
a a 5 (2~Y-V-W)W(2~YtVfW)I(V.W){(V}W)(V-W)f4~(t-V)} ~ aP.22
The ezpression of the profit mazimizing reservation screening level of a hierazchy is
S" - t t k(a,V,W).
This is an interior solution when
-2~Y}V C k(a,V,W) ~ -W.
The compazative statics result of this interior solution regazding a is the same as for a polyazchy,
i.e. a better portfolio will result in a óigher acceptance probability of local bureaus ia a hierarchy.
The boundary solution ~- W generates expected profits of
aV(V.W)zl4`lrz.
This boundary solution will emerge when there is not an interior solution and
(2) 5 (4)
~ a 5 W(2~Y-V-W)ZI(V'W)(4~Y(~Y-W)}(Wt~~-~) ~ a".
(4)
It can be shown that a" c aP.
Suppose that ~Y - W G S' c~Y f V. The profit mazimizing reservation screening level
of a polyazchy is ~Y - W and the associated profits are given by (3). It is easy to show that there is
no screening level in the above range whicó exceeds the profits given by ezpression (4), because
any realisation of y larger than ~- W has to be a good project. Similaz observations hold for a
hierazchy. The profit mazimizing reservation screening level of a hierazchy is ~Y - W and the
associated profits are given by (4).
Suppose that ~ f V C S'. There is no project whicó can generate revenues ezceeding an
S` satisfying this inequality. All projects will be rejected and the ezpected profits for both
azchitectures aze therefore zero.23
The vatue of a for which the profit mazimizing screening level is a boundary solution and
switches from fi- W to -~ f V is defined as aH for a hierazchy and aP for a polyazchy. 7hese
pazameters aze only relevant when a is such that there is a boundary solution. Figure 7 summari-
zes these results when there is not an interior solution for the hierarchy as well as the polyazchy.
The range of a for which the profit maaimizing screeaing level is an interior solution will
now be determined. This range is [a",a") for the hierazchy and [a~,ai] for a polyazchy. Figure 7
illustrates the relationship between the range of a for which there is an interior solution of either a












Figure 7: Portfolio composition and interior solution range.
We get after some rearranging that24
a" - 0




W(2~Y;V.W) ctti - (V}~(2~,}~.
The ezpressions for a", a;, a~, aze all a decreasing function of V. It can be shown that the
relationship between a„ and a, and these ranges for which there is an interior solution results ia
aH C ar
~C~-
Figure 8 summazizes the results regazding the profit mazimizing screening level choice and the
portfolio composition, where aH is assumed to be larger than a". (If a„ 5 a", then the interval
[n~, a„] disappeazs from figure 8.) Notice that it follows immediately from figure 8 that the profit
mazimizing screening level choice of bureaus in a polyarchy is at least as óigh in a hierazchy.
....................................... .... - -..................................- ... -
SP-T-W SP--3Tt)c(a,V,wÍ SP-T-W ; SP--TfV:
:...... ..................... ..................:...........................:..............:...............:
SH-~fIC(R,V.~ SH-~-w : SH--~tV
H P P I
OCn OGH OC~ ILa CP
Figure 8: Profit maximizing screening level and portfolio composition
The profit mazimizing screening level of a bureau in a duopoly is similaz to the monopoly
situation. The ezpression for p(z,S') does not change, but expected profits of architecture i when
faced with architecture j aze now equal to a1;(1-f~12)V -(1-a)f;W. If there is an interior solution
when -~ t V c S' c~- W, then the ezpression of the profit mazimizing screening level
choice is25





for a polyazchy facing architecture j and
SK - ~ f k(a,V,W,f~
for a hierarchy facing architecture j.
The derivative of k(a,V,W,f~ with respect to f is positive. Screening levels are inversely
related to f, which implies that there is a negative relationship between the profit maximizing
screening level of the firm (having either a hierazchy or a polyazchy) and the screening level of
the rival. Screening levels are therefore strategic substitutes.
The comparative statics results of the equilibrium screening level choice when both firms
have the same azchitecture can be obtained by using the formulas of Cazdano for third degree
polynomials. They are cumbersome and do not provide mucó insight. Recourse óas therefore been
taken to a graphical illustration, which is generated by the computer package 'Mathematica'.
Figure 9 shows the comparative statics results regarding a and V for W- 6 and ~Y - 10 and
both firms having a polyazchy. They resemble the monopoly situation in that the profit mazimi-
zing screening level choice increases when a andlor V decreases.26
1
Figure 9: Compazative staiics results regazding ~ aad V27
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